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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY CORP.,
:

Case No. 20040280-CA

:

Incarcerated

APPELLANT,
v.
SALT LAKE CITY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,
RESPONDENT.

:
:

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 provides this Court's jurisdiction over the final
order of the civil service commission.
ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
Did the civil service commission abuse its discretion in reversing the police chiefs
termination of Lieutenant Begay?
The commission's ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.. Salt
Lake City Corp v. Salt Lake Civil Service Com'n., 908 P.2d 871 (Utah App. 1995).
Ms. Begay's arguments were raised before the commission in evidentiary hearings,
arguments and briefing (R. 153, 154,67-71, 132-152).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The pertinent constitutional provisions and statutes are in the addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The chief of police terminated Lieutenant Begay from her employment with the
Salt Lake City Police Department (e.g. R. 5-10).
She appealed the termination to the civil service commission (R. 4).
The commission held a full evidentiary hearing and then issued a memorandum
concluding that Begay should be reinstated (R. 22-27). The commission entered findings
of fact and conclusions of law in support of her reinstatement (R. 28-32).
The city filed a motion for relief from the findings of fact and conclusions of law
(R. 33-56). Begay filed a reply (R. 67-71), and the city filed a response (R. 72-82). Both
parties filed final briefs (R. 89-131; 132-135).
After hearing oral arguments, the commission denied the motion for relief from the
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 149, R. 154).
The city appealed (R. 151).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Lieutenant Begay served as a Salt Lake City Police Officer for sixteen and a half
years, and served in the military police before that - police work was her life (R. 153 at
221-22). She received numerous commendations for her excellent service (R. 153 at 1013, 221-23; Deposition Exhibit A, pages 2-28). Her job performance evaluations from
1986 through 2001 were excellent (Deposition Exhibit A, pages 30-46).
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The chief of police recognized that she was an outstanding police officer with no
history of discipline, who had received excellent evaluations and many commendations,
and who had earned her Master of Social Work degree while serving as a police officer
(R. 153 at 90-91).
While she was in school working on her Master's, she maintained a grade point
average close to 4.0, and taught courses in conferences on alcohol and drug dependency,
on the role of peyote and Native American Church involvement in healing alcoholism (R.
153 at 118). As part of her social work education, Begay performed psychiatric and
trauma evaluations at the University of Utah Emergency Department (R. 153 at 120). She
was the head of the CIT, or Crimes Intervention Team, designed to deal with mentally ill
and violent offenders, and developed a statewide program on how to handle mentally ill
people (R. 153 at 223). She was also a highly effective narcotics officer (R. 153 at 226).
Begay is an enrolled member of the Cherokee Chippewa Tribe, and a member of
the Native American Church (R. 153 at 223). Peyote is a holy sacrament which is used in
Native American Church ceremonies, and its religious use by Native Americans is
protected by federal law, see 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (R. 153 at 226). Begay's use of peyote
never interfered with her work, and she discussed it with her fellow officers and
supervisors (R. 153 at 226-228).
Numerous fellow officers and others who had worked with her in the mental health
field attested to her integrity and high ethical standards, to her exemplary commitment to
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her work, and to the fact that her religious involvement with peyote was not detrimental
to her or her professional performance in any way (R. 153 at 121-122, 185-87, 188-90,
200,201-03).
In July of 2002, the police department received an anonymous letter complaining
that Begay's use of peyote in the Native American Church was illegal because Begay is
not Native American, but is only married to a Native American (R. 153 at 20, Deposition
Exhibit A, page 49).
Actually, Begay is not only married to a Native American, but also is one herself
(E.g. Deposition Exhibit A, page 99).
The department did not inform Begay of the anonymous letter, but instead waited
for some six months while the city attorney consulted with the department and considered
the legality of her using peyote (R. 153 at 92, 103).
When Begay was informed of the allegation some six months after the department
received it, she was fully cooperative in the internal affairs investigation, and admitted to
using peyote and to having peyote in her home as part of her religious practice in the
Native American Church, of which she is a member (Deposition Exhibit A, pages 98 and
100, 107, 116, 120, R. 153 at 231-232).
The police went to Begay's home and confiscated a bottle of dried peyote powder
and 87 live peyote buttons (R. 117-131; R. 153 at 232).
Begay had made the powder by grinding the parts of the plants that had rotted or
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died, as the religion forbids wasting any of the peyote plant (R. 153 at 235). She and her
husband had used part of the powder in religious ceremonies with her parents when they
were ill (R. 153 at 242).
The Begays had received the 87 buttons from other NAC members, who had
lawfully received them from a custodian (R. 153 at 234).
Lieutenant Begay testified that she kept the live peyote in soil to preserve it for a
future ceremony, as the fresh plants will rot or die if they are not in soil, and as fresh
plants are at times used in religious ceremonies (Deposition Exhibit A, page 202; R. 153
at234-36).1
She believed that under the Indian Religious Freedom Act, their possession and

Professor of social work of American Indian studies, E. Daniel Edwards, testified
that Native American Church members commonly take live plants home and keep them in
pots or in the ground to preserve them for later church ceremonies (R. 153 at 107, 112).
Kristi Renae Begay, Terry Begay's sister-in-law, testified that NAC members often
store fresh peyote buttons, both with and without roots, in the dirt to preserve them, as
refrigerators are used to store food, because otherwise, they will dry up and bruise (R. 153
at 135, 140). She explained that custodians often order large numbers of buttons and
entrust them to church members to keep them green (R. 153 at 137). She confirmed that
members save every part of the peyote plant and do not waste it (R. 153 at 141).
Franklin Pine, a peyote ceremony leader, testified about how people sometimes
take entire plants from the distributors and keep them in sandy soil and occasionally water
them until they are needed for healing ceremonies (R. 153 at 157, 164). He explained that
people will eat the live plants, roots and all (R. 153 at 165-66). It is hard to get the green
medicine, and when people do, they preserve it in the dirt (R. 153 at 169, 173).
Timothy Dish Sr., confirmed that people keep individual plants in the ground as a
way to save it until they need it (R. 153 at 181).
Johnny Yellowman testified that people often replant peyote in the dirt and keep it
in their homes to use it later and keep it fresh (R. 153 at 194-96).
5

use of peyote for religious purposes were lawful (R. 153 at 236-38). As she understood
the lawful process, the DEA has distributors who harvest peyote and send it to custodians,
who deliver it to the sponsors, or hosts of the ceremonies, at which point it is lawfully in
the hands of the church and its members (T. 23 8-241).2 In keeping the 87 peyote buttons
in the soil and caring for the plants, she was preserving lawfully obtained peyote (T. 239).
She would have been willing to refrain from taking the peyote sacrament, had her
career so required, but she was never given the opportunity to do so before the chief
terminated her employment (R. 153 at 246).
The chief of police terminated Begay for planting and growing peyote, as he
considered this a felony (R. 153 at 89, 105).
He acknowledged that officers may violate the law and receive lesser sanctions,
such as suspensions, and that lesser sanctions are always available (R. 153 at 81, 89). He
did not consider lesser sanctions in this case, however, because the crime involved was a
felony (R. 153 at 89).
In the appeal from the chiefs termination of Begay, the commission recognized
Begay's outstanding sixteen-and-a-half year career as a police woman, Begay's status as

2

Jerry Ellis, DEA peyote expert, described the law governing peyote,
confirming that federally licensed peyote distributors harvest naturally growing peyote
and distribute it to custodians in the Native American Church (R. 153 at 40-46). Once the
peyote reaches the custodians, the government does not regulate it (R. 153 at 61).
Walter E. Echohawk of the Native American Rights Fund, who signed the c into
law, told Begay and their activities were protected use and possession of the peyote
medicine (R. 153 at 243, 252).
6

an American Indian, Begay's commitment to the Native American Church, and Begay5s
federally protected right to partake of peyote as part of her religious practice (R. 22-23,
29).
The commission recognized that the evidence was unclear regarding Begay's
intent in putting the peyote buttons she had received in soil, but specifically found after
considering the conflicting evidence that Begay's primary purpose in putting the buttons
in soil was to preserve them, in accordance with standard NAC practices (R. 23-24, 30).
The commission reviewed the applicable federal law and concluded that Begay's
use of peyote, and preserving it in soil in her home, were strictly connected with her
participation in the religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and constituted
federally protected use, possession and transportation of peyote (R. 25).
The commission found that the police department had not carried its burden under
its rules to prove that Begay had violated the law, and concluded that her termination was
both unjustified and disproportionate (R. 26, 31). The commission noted that it was not
clear that Begay had violated the law, and recognized that perhaps she should have
clarified the legality of her activities (R. 26, 31). The commission concluded that perhaps
the department could have counseled or warned Begay, but that her termination was not
justified (R. 26-27, 31). The commission ordered her reinstated as an employee in good
standing in the police department (R. 27, 31).
After the city challenged this ruling, the commission maintained that after
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reviewing the internal affairs investigation, it was convinced that the chief of police
should not have terminated Begay, because she had not manufactured the 87 buttons the
police had confiscated from her home, but had merely been preserving the same 87
buttons she had received from the couple from Arizona (R. 154 at 11-12).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act protects Native Americans' use
possession and transportation of peyote for religious purposes, and does not exclude live
peyote from religious protection or require that the peyote involved must be dead.
Begay's possession, use and transportation of the live and dead peyote is protected by this
federal law.
While the CFR does require those who manufacture or distribute peyote for the
Native American Church to register, Begay was not acting as a manufacturer or
distributor for the church, but was possessing the live peyote in the dirt in order to
preserve it in live form, and was grinding the dead peyote into powder in order to
preserve it, and sharing the peyote in religious ceremonies in the course of her religious
use, possession and transportation of peyote.
The commission carefully considered the testimony of the witnesses who testified
before the commission, the internal affairs investigation, and all evidence presented and
determined that Begay's intent in keeping the 87 peyote buttons in soil was to preserve
the peyote in live form.

8

The commission properly concluded that the police department failed to carry its
burden of proving that Begay had violated the law,3 and that Begay's termination was
disproportionate to any impropriety that may have occurred.
ARGUMENTS
I.
THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND
THAT BEGAY WAS NOT MANUFACTURING PEYOTE.
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act protects Native Americans' use
possession and transportation of peyote for religious purposes, and does not exclude live
peyote from religious protection or require that the peyote involved must be dead. The act
does not define or otherwise limit the terms use, possess or transport. See id. Begay's
use, possession and transportation of the live and dead peyote is protected by this federal
law. See42U.S.C. 1996a.
While the CFR does require those who manufacture or distribute peyote for the
Native American Church to register, 21 CFR 1307.31, Begay was not acting as a
manufacturer or distributor for the church, but was possessing the live peyote in the dirt in
order to preserve it in live form. Jerry Ellis, DEA peyote expert, described federally
licensed peyote distributors, who can harvest and dry naturally growing peyote in Texas,
and distribute it to custodians in the Native American Church (R. 153 at 40-46). He
3

Rule 6-4-6(4) of the Salt Lake Civil Service Commission's rules requires the
department to carry the burden of proof in disciplinary appeals. See
http://slcilp.slcgov.com/Civi^
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testified that once the peyote reaches the custodians, the government does not regulate it
amongst church members (R. 153 at 61). Begay also recognized that the DEA has
distributors who harvest peyote and send it to custodians, who deliver it to the sponsor, or
host of the ceremonies (R. 153 at 238-241). At that point, it is lawfully in the hands of
the church and its members (R. 153 at 239). In keeping in the dirt the 87 peyote buttons
she had received from the church members who had received them from a legal
custodian, Begay was preserving lawfully obtained peyote (R. 153 at 239).
The commission carefully considered the testimony of the witnesses who testified
before the commission, the internal affairs investigation, and all evidence presented and
determined that Begay's intent in keeping the 87 peyote buttons in soil was to preserve
the peyote in live form (R. 23-26,30-31; R. 154 at 11-12).
A. PURPORTED INADEQUACY OF COMMISSION FINDINGS
The city assails the commission for failing to make findings regarding whether
Begay violated federal law when she ground dead peyote plant into powder, or when she
shared it with others during religious ceremonies. City's brief at 11-12, 15-22.
Begay has never contested grinding dried peyote into powder to preserve it, or
sharing the powder. Because the evidence is clear and uncontroverted on this point, the
absence of findings is of no consequence. See, e.g., Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service
Com'n., 949 P.2d 746, 755 (Utah App. 1997) (absence of findings is inconsequential
when evidence is clear, uncontroverted, and capable of only one conclusion).
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The commission's focusing on whether Begay was manufacturing peyote, as
opposed to whether she processed or distributed it, is explained by the fact that Chief
Dinse did not refer to the latter two factors when he explained why he fired Begay. He
stated, "The duty - yeah, the issue is her obligation as a police officer in planting and
growing peyote." (R. 153 at 105).
Given that the commission was supposed to assess whether the facts supported the
department head's decision, see Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, ^f 10,
2005 WL 1404604, the commission properly addressed the basis for Chief Dinse's
terminating Begay - Begay's alleged planting and growing of the peyote (R. 153 at 105).
Assuming arguendo that the Commission was obligated to make findings, the
record reflects that Begay did not violate the law in grinding the dead peyote into powder
or in sharing it with other church members, facts she has not disputed. As DEA Agent
Ellis explained, once peyote goes from federally regulated harvesters and distributors to
church members, the government no longer regulates it (R. 153 at 61). The evidence
before the commission demonstrates that in the course of their religious use of peyote,
Native American Church members routinely grind dried peyote into powder, routinely
add water to this powder and thereby make it into tea, routinely store live plants in dirt at
home to use in later ceremonies, and routinely share it with one another prior to and
throughout the ceremonies (e.g. R. 153 at 110-113, Deposition Exhibit A at 142, 152).
What might be viewed as processing or distributing a controlled substance in another
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context is essential to, inherent in, and protected as religious use, possession and
transportation of peyote by the Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996a.4
4

Reviewing the expressed legislative intent and most critical parts of the act takes a
minute, but is worthwhile. 42 U.S.C. 1996(a) and (b)(1) and (2) state:
The Congress finds and declares that(1) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a
religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant
in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures;
(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by
Federal regulation;
(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws which are similar to, or are in
conformance with, the Federal regulation which protects the ceremonial use of
peyote by Indian religious practitioners, 22 States have not done so, and this lack
of uniformity has created hardship for Indian people who participate in such
religious ceremonies;
(4) the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that the First Amendment does not protect Indian
practitioners who use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies, and also raised
uncertainty whether this religious practice would be protected under the
compelling State interest standard; and
(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the religious use of peyote by
Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and
increase the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment.
(b) Use, possession, or transportation of peyote
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or
transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes
in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall
not be prohibited by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or
discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession or transportation,
including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise applicable benefits under public
assistance programs.
(2) This section does not prohibit such reasonable regulation and registration by
the Drug Enforcement Administration of those persons who cultivate, harvest, or
distribute peyote as may be consistent with the purposes of this section and section
1996 of this title.
12

B. COMMISSION'S RECOGNITION OF CONFUSING LAW
The city complains that the commission found that the law regarding the
lawfulness of Begay's conduct is confusing. City's brief at 22-27.
The commission correctly recognized that a lesser punishment than termination,
such as a warning or counseling, was in order, particularly given the confusing nature of
the law (R. 26-27, 31).
The record reflects that the police department did not take action on the
anonymous letter complaining of Begay's use of peyote for six months because it was
consulting with the city attorney's office for six months regarding the lawfulness of
Begay's use of peyote (R. 153 at 92, 103).
Chief Llewellyn's letter to Begay reflects uncertainty regarding whether she is
entitled to any protection under the federal law, given her tribal status (Deposition Exhibit
A, page 196), and after describing the facts he felt established her commission of a
felony, his letter reflects that she "may be in violation o f the department policy requiring
her to obey the law (Deposition Exhibit A, page 195)(emphasis added).
While the city is correct that the record does not disclose why the commission's
lawyer was confused by the law, by reviewing 18 U.S.C. 1996a, this Court can readily
confirm that the law is somewhat vague and confusing.
The confusion in the law stems from the fact that the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act does not define the terms use, transport, possess, distribute or manufacture,

13

the first three of which terms describe protected conduct, and the last two of which terms
describe conduct which may be regulated by registration and other requirements. See id.
subsection (b)(1) and (2).
The absence of definitions is problematic, because what might ordinarily be
considered acts of distribution and manufacturing are inherent parts of religious use and
possession of peyote. Native American Church members routinely grind dried peyote
into powder, routinely add water to this powder and thereby make it into tea, routinely
store live plants in dirt at home to use in later ceremonies, and routinely share it with one
another prior to and throughout the ceremonies (e.g. R. 153 at 110-113, Deposition
Exhibit A at 142, 152).
The city perfunctorily asserts that Begay's conduct "was not the use of peyote in a
bone fide religious ceremony," but fails to recognize that the AIRFA grants far broader
protection. It states in subsection (b):
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or
transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial
purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is
lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United States or any State. No
Indian shall be penalized or discriminated against on the basis of such use,
possession or transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of
otherwise applicable benefits under public assistance programs.
Before the commission, the city presented no case law or other legal arguments in
support of its conclusion that Begay's conduct amounts to felonious manufacturing, or
producing or distribution of a controlled substance, but relied exclusively on the

14

testimony of DEA expert Jerry Ellis. The city on appeal likewise relies on Ellis'
testimony to establish the law. City's brief at 19-20, 25. Mr. Ellis, however, was a law
enforcement investigator and officer (R. 153 at 41-42), who dealt primarily with
registered peyote distributors and custodians, who were subject to criminal, civil or
administrative penalties and registration revocations (R. 153 at 54-55). He had never had
any experience in a prosecution against someone in Begay's position (R. 153 at 57-58).
While the city asserts that Begay's conduct amounts to manufacturing and
producing a controlled substance under the definitions of those terms set forth in 21
U.S.C. 802, e.g. city's brief at 42, those definitions specifically apply only to the control
and enforcement subchapter of title 21, see 21 U.S.C. § 802 ("As used in this subchapter
..."), and have no application to Title 42, the location of the AIRFA.
Given that Native American Church members routinely grind dried peyote into
powder, routinely add water to this powder and thereby make it into tea, routinely store
live plants in dirt at home to use in later ceremonies, and routinely share it with one
another prior to and throughout the ceremonies (e.g. R. 153 at 110-113, Deposition
Exhibit A at 142, 152), it is apparent that traditional religious use and possession of
peyote involves conduct which might otherwise amount to manufacturing or cultivation
or distribution of a controlled substance.
While it appears that the only people who are regulated in manufacturing and
distributing peyote are those who harvest it in Texas and distribute it to custodians for
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unregulated distribution and use among church members (R. 40-46, 61, testimony of DEA
expert), and that conduct such as Begay's is legally protected (R. 153 at 243, 252, opinion
of Walter E. Echohawk of the Native American Rights Fund, who signed the AIRFA into
law), the police chief and the city are apparently honestly confused into believing that
Begay's conduct amounted to felony distribution or manufacturing of a controlled
substance (Deposition Exhibit A, page 195, R. 153 at 89, 105).
The city and the police chiefs ultimate decision take the position that when Begay
purportedly processed or manufactured the peyote without the registration required by 21
CFR 1307.31, or distributed the peyote, this stripped her religious use and possession and
transportation of peyote of the religious protection provided by 42 USC 1996a (e.g. R.
153 at 89, 105, city's brief at 24). Federal law, however, does not indicate that a Native
American who is in violation of the registration requirements is thereby stripped of all
protection of the AIRFA, or guilty of a felony, or that her use and possession of peyote
which might arguably otherwise constitute cultivation and distribution, are unprotected or
felonious. Nor is there any case law on point. From the testimony of Mr. Ellis, it appears
that if Begay's conduct amounts to distribution of peyote without registration, this could
result in any number of federal consequences, ranging from criminal, civil or
administrative penalties (R. 153 at 54-55).
The commission was correct in recognizing that the city had failed to carry its

16

burden of proving that Begay had violated the law,5 and correctly recognized that the
confusion in the law should ameliorate the consequences of any purported violations.
See Qgden City Corp. v. Harmon. 2005 UT App 274, % 18, 2005 WL 1404604 ("an
exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of misconduct may tip the balance against
termination.").
C. CHALLENGE TO FINDINGS REGARDING GROWING VERSUS PRESERVING
PEYOTE
The city marshals the evidence supporting the commission's finding that Begay
was not manufacturing peyote when she preserved it in live form in dirt, and contends
that the commission abused its discretion in failing to recognize that Begay was
manufacturing peyote. City's brief at 33-41.
The commission carefully considered the testimony of the witnesses who testified
before the commission, the internal affairs investigation, and all evidence presented, and
determined that Begay's intent in keeping the 87 peyote buttons in soil was to preserve
the peyote in live form (R. 23-26,30-31; R. 154 at 11-12).
In reviewing the commission's factual findings, this Court bears in mind that the
legislature has designated the commission as the fact finder in this context, and has
required the commission to find the relevant facts and apply the law to those facts. See,

5

Rule 6-4-6(4) of the Salt Lake Civil Service Commission's rules requires the
department to carry the burden of proof in disciplinary appeals. See
http://slcilp.slcgov.com/Civil^
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e.g.. Qgden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, % 9, 2005 WL 1404604.
Accordingly, the Court reverses the commission only if its decision was beyond the limits
of reasonableness and rationality. Id. When credibility issues are involved, this Court
does not re-weigh the evidence, but defers to the commission. E.g., Huemiller v. Qgden
City Civil Service Comm'n. 2004 UT App 375, flf 2 and 3 and n.l, 101 P.3d 394.
The commission recognized that the evidence was unclear and conflicting
regarding Begay's intent in putting the peyote buttons she had received in soil, but
specifically found after considering the conflicting evidence that Begay's primary purpose
in putting the buttons in soil was to preserve them, in accordance with standard NAC
practices (R. 23-24,30).
In challenging these findings, the city makes no argument that the commission's
resolution of the evidence was beyond the limits of reasonableness or rationality, or that
there is any legal basis for this Court to re-weigh the evidence and re-assess the credibility
of the testimony. But see, e.g., Harmon and Huemiller, supra. Instead, the city argues
that the commission abused its discretion in failing to recognize that Begay was
manufacturing and producing peyote. City's brief at 42. In this argument, the city is
relying on the definitions of manufacturing and producing a controlled substance under
the definitions of 21 U.S.C. 802. E.g. city's brief at 42. As noted supra, those definitions
specifically apply only to the control and enforcement subchapter of title 21, see 21
U.S.C. § 802 ("As used in this subchapter ..."), and have no application to Title 42, the
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location of the AIRFA.
Because the city has neither attempted to meet nor met its burden to show that the
commission's finding was beyond the limits of reasonableness or rationality, and has
done nothing to justify this Court's deviating from the standard proscriptions against reweighing of the evidence and reassessing credibility issues on appeal, and is relying on
inapplicable law in challenging the finding, the Court should affirm the finding that
Begay was preserving the peyote in the soil, a protected act under AIRFA. See, Harmon;
Huemiller, supra.
II.
THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND
THAT THE TERMINATION OF BEGAY
WAS DISPROPORTIONATE.
The commission properly concluded that the police department failed to carry its
burden of proving that Begay had violated the law, and that Begay's termination was
disproportionate to any impropriety that may have occurred.
In reviewing a disciplinary decision, the commission normally must defer to the
chief of police to a certain extent, as the chief would normally be in the best position to
know whether punishment is warranted. See Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App
274, TI 17, 2005 WL 1404604. If the discipline the chief imposes is clearly
disproportionate or beyond the limits of reasonableness, the commission may reverse.
See id.
In this instance, however, the chiefs decision to fire Lieutenant Begay turned on a
19

legal conclusion - that her conduct amounted to a felony (R. 153 at 89, 105). He
conceded that he would "probably have to reinstate her" if she had not committed a crime
(R. 153 at 95).
Given that the chief was not in a superior position to the commission to assess
whether Begay's conduct amounted to a crime, the deference that would normally extend
to his firing decision was and is not required.
In assessing a punishment for proportionality,
an exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of misconduct may tip
the balance against termination. On the other hand, dishonesty, id., or a
series of violations accompanied by apparently ineffective progressive
discipline may support termination. Other courts have given weight to
considerations of (a) whether the violation is directly related to the
employee's official duties and significantly impedes his or her ability to
carry out those duties; (b) whether the offense was of a type that adversely
affects the public confidence in the department; (c) whether the offense
undermines the morale and effectiveness of the department; or (d) whether
the offense was committed willfully or knowingly, rather than negligently
or inadvertently.
Harmon, at ^f 18 (citations omitted).
In Harmon, this Court reversed a civil service commission's decision reversing a
fire department chiefs decision to terminate a fire department captain. In the course of
reaching its conclusion, the commission found that the captain had organized an event
wherein firefighters appeared in public with topless women, had missed three mandatory
training meetings, had provided to a superior officer a bottle of urine in lieu of weed
killer, and had urinated into a water pit being used by another fire crew. Id. at ^f 3. There
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was also evidence at the hearing, which two of the three commissioners declined to
consider, that the captain had urinated into a shower stall occupied by another fire fighter,
and had engaged in sexual banter with, and had presented a greased zucchini, to a
probationary female firefighter. Id. at ^ 4-5. The captain had also permitted subordinate
male fire fighters to routinely "hump" one another in horseplay. Id. at ^f 6.
This Court reversed the commission, holding that the commission should have
considered all of the captain's alleged misbehavior, and also should have determined
whether the captain was dishonest during the official investigation into his misbehavior.
Id. at ^ 12-15. The Court remanded to the commission for consideration of whether the
punishment was proportionate under the factors listed above. Id. at ^[16-18.
In contrast to the facts in Harmon, as the discussion in point I demonstrates, there
is no clear proof that Lieutenant Begay committed any offense, because her conduct was
all geared toward her legitimate religious use, possession and transportation of peyote.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a. If she did commit an offense, it was certainly not a willful or
knowing one.
Lieutenant Begay has served our community as a Salt Lake City Police Officer for
sixteen and a half years, and served in the military police before that - police work was
her life (R. 153 at 221-22). She received numerous commendations for her excellent
service (R. 153 at 10-13, 221-23; Deposition Exhibit A, pages 2-28). Her job
performance evaluations from 1986 through 2001 were excellent (Deposition Exhibit A,
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pages 30-46).
The chief of police recognized that she was an outstanding police officer with no
history of discipline, who had received excellent evaluations and many commendations,
and who had earned her Master of Social Work degree while serving as a police officer
(R. 153 at 90-91).
While she was in school working on her Master's, she maintained a grade point
average close to 4.0, and taught courses in conferences on alcohol and drug dependency,
on the role of peyote and Native American Church involvement in healing alcoholism (R.
153 at 118). As part of her social work education, Begay performed psychiatric and
trauma evaluations at the University of Utah Emergency Department (R. 153 at 120). She
was the head of the CIT, or Crimes Intervention Team, designed to deal with mentally ill
and violent offenders, and developed a statewide program on how to handle mentally ill
people (R. 153 at 223). She was also a highly effective narcotics officer (R. 153 at 226).
Begay is an enrolled member of the Cherokee Chippewa Tribe, and a member of
the Native American Church (R. 153 at 223). Peyote is a holy sacrament which is used in
Native American Church ceremonies, and its religious use by Native Americans is
protected by federal law, see 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (R. 153 at 226). Begay's use of peyote
never interfered with her work, and she discussed it with her fellow officers and
supervisors (R. 153 at 226-228).
Numerous fellow officers and others who had worked with her in the mental health
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field attested to her integrity and high ethical standards, to her exemplary commitment to
her work, and to the fact that her religious involvement with peyote was not detrimental
to her or her professional performance in any way (R. 153 at 121-122, 185-87, 188-90,
200,201-03).
On these facts, the commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
chiefs termination of Begay was disproportionate. The proof of any violation by Begay
was tenuous, and did not establish a willful violation. Her service record is excellent and
her commitment to our police force has been above reproach for sixteen-and-a-half years.
She has no record of dishonesty, serial violations, or unresponsiveness to discipline. Her
alleged violation has not effected or impeded her performance as a police officer, and has
not demoralized or scandalized the department.
On these facts, the commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
chiefs termination of Begay was disproportionate. Cf. Harmon, supra.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the commission's decision ordering the reinstatement of
Lieutenant Begay as a Salt Lake City Police Department lieutenant in good standing.
Respectfully submitted this July

&

, 2005.

Edward K. Brass
Counsel for Lieutenant Begay
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Controlling Statutes and Regulation

2

21 CFR 1307.31
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the
nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church,
and members of the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt from
registration. Any person who manufactures peyote for or distributes peyote to the Native
American Church, however, is required to obtain registration annually and to comply with
all other requirements of law.
21 U.S.C. § 802. Definitions

As used in this subchapter:
1.

(1) The term "addict" means any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug
so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so far
addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with
reference to his addiction.

(2) The term "administer" refers to the direct application of a controlled substance to the
body of a patient or research subject by~
(A) a practitioner (or, in his presence, by his authorized agent), or
(B) the patient or research subject at the direction and in the presence of the practitioner,
whether such application be by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means.
(3) The term "agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the direction
of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; except that such term does not include a
common or contract carrier, public warehouseman, or employee of the carrier or
warehouseman, when acting in the usual and lawful course of the carrier's or
warehouseman's business.
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(4) The term "Drug Enforcement Administration" means the Drug Enforcement
Administration in the Department of Justice.
(5) The term "control" means to add a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, to
a schedule under part B of this subchapter, whether by transfer from another schedule or
otherwise.
(6) The term "controlled substance" means a drug or other substance, or immediate
precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter. The term
does not include distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco, as those terms are
defined or used in subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
(7) The term "counterfeit substance" means a controlled substance which, or the container
or labeling of which, without authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, number, or device, or any likeness thereof, of a manufacturer,
distributor, or dispenser other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured,
distributed, or dispensed such substance and which thereby falsely purports or is
represented to be the product of, or to have been distributed by, such other manufacturer,
distributor, or dispenser.
(8) The terms "deliver" or "delivery" mean the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer
of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or not there exists an agency
relationship.
(9) The term "depressant or stimulant substance" means—
(A) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric acid or any ol the salts ot barbituric
acid; or
(B) a drug which contains any quantity of (i) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers;
(ii) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of amphetamine; or (iii) any
substance which the Attorney General, after investigation, has found to be, and by
regulation designated as, habit forming because of its stimulant effect on the central
nervous system; or
(C) lysergic acid diethylamide; or
(D) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the Attorney General,
after investigation, has found to have, and by regulation designated as having, a potential
for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its
hallucinogenic effect.
(10) The term "dispense" means to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or
4

research subject by, or pursuant to the lawful order of, a practitioner, including the
prescribing and administering of a controlled substance and the packaging, labeling or
compounding necessary to prepare the substance for such delivery. The term "dispenser"
means a practitioner who so delivers a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research
subject.
(11) The term "distribute" means to deliver (other than by administering or dispensing) a
controlled substance or a listed chemical. The term "distributor" means a person who so
delivers a controlled substance or a listed chemical.
(12) The term "drug" has the meaning given that term by section 32 UgXl) of this title.
(13) The term "felony" means any Federal or State offense classified by applicable
Federal or State law as a felony.
(14) The term "isomer" means the optical isomer, except as used in schedule 1(c) and
schedule 11(a)(4). As used in schedule 1(c), the term "isomer" means any optical,
positional, or geometric isomer. As used in schedule 11(a)(4), the term "isomer" means
any optical or geometric isomer.
(15) The term "manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation,
compounding, or processing of a drug or other substance, either directly or indirectly or
by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical
synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any
packaging or repackaging of such substance or labeling or relabeling of its container;
except that such term does not include the preparation, compounding, packaging, or
labeling of a drug or other substance in conformity with applicable State or local law by a
practitioner as an incident to his administration or dispensing of such drug or substance in
the course of his professional practice. The term "manufacturer" means a person who
manufactures a drug or other substance.
(16) The term "marihuana" means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether
growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and
every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its
seeds or resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced
from such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other compound,
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks (except the
resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is
incapable of germination.
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(17) The term "narcotic drug" means any of the following whether produced directly or
indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means
of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis:
(A) Opium, opiates, derivatives of opium and opiates, including their isomers, esters,
ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, whenever the existence of such
isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within the specific chemical designation. Such
term does not include the isoquinoline alkaloids of opium.
(B) Poppy straw and concentrate of poppy straw.
(C) Coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves from which cocaine,
ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts have been removed.
(D) Cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers.
(E) Ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.
(F) Any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of any of the
substances referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (E).
(18) The term "opiate" means any drug or other substance having an addiction-forming or
addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being capable of conversion into a
drug having such addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability.
(19) The term "opium poppy" means the plant of the species Papaver somniferum L.,
except the seed thereof.
(20) The term "poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium poppy, after
mowing.
(21) The term "practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, scientific
investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise
permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices or does research,
to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or
chemical analysis, a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or
research.
(22) The term "production" includes the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or
harvesting of a controlled substance.
(23) The term "immediate precursor" means a substance-(A) which the Attorney General has found to be and by regulation designated as being the
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principal compound used, or produced primarily for use, in the manufacture of a
controlled substance;
(B) which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely to be used in the
manufacture of such controlled substance; and
(C) the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture of such
controlled substance.
(24) The term "Secretary", unless the context otherwise indicates, means the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.
(25) The term "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which involves—
(A) a substantial risk of death;
(B) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or
(C) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
faculty.
(26) The term "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and
any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
(27) The term "ultimate user" means a person who has lawfully obtained, and who
possesses, a controlled substance for his own use or for the use of a member of his
household or for an animal owned by him or by a member of his household.
(28) The term "United States", when used in a geographic sense, means all places and
waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(29) The term "maintenance treatment" means the dispensing, for a period in excess of
twenty-one days, of a narcotic drug in the treatment of an individual for dependence upon
heroin or other morphine-like drugs.
(30) The term "detoxification treatment" means the dispensing, for a period not in excess
of one hundred and eighty days, of a narcotic drug in decreasing doses to an individual in
order to alleviate adverse physiological or psychological effects incident to withdrawal
from the continuous or sustained use of a narcotic drug and as a method of bringing the
individual to a narcotic drug-free state within such period.
(31) The term "Convention on Psychotropic Substances" means the Convention on
Psychotropic Substances signed at Vienna, Austria, on February 21, 1971; and the term
"Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs" means the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
7

signed at New York, New York, on March 30, 1961.
(32)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the term "controlled substance
analogue" means a substance(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a
controlled substance in schedule I or II;
(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule
I or II; or
(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or intends to have a
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is
substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect
on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II.
(B) The designation of gamma butyrolactone or any other chemical as a listed chemical
pursuant to paragraph (34) or (35) does not preclude a finding pursuant to subparagraph
(A) of this paragraph that the chemical is a controlled substance analogue.
(C) Such term does not include(i) a controlled substance;
(ii) any substance for which there is an approved new drug application;
(iii) with respect to a particular person any substance, if an exemption is in effect for
investigational use, for that person, under section 355 of this title to the extent conduct
with respect to such substance is pursuant to such exemption; or
(iv) any substance to the extent not intended for human consumption before such an
exemption takes effect with respect to that substance.
(33) The term "listed chemical" means any list I chemical or any list II chemical.
(34) The term "list I chemical" means a chemical specified by regulation of the Attorney
General as a chemical that is used in manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of
this subchapter and is important to the manufacture of the controlled substances, and such
term includes (until otherwise specified by regulation of the Attorney General, as
considered appropriate by the Attorney General or upon petition to the Attorney General
by any person) the following:
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(A) Anthranilic acid, its esters, and its salts.
(B) Benzyl cyanide.
(C) Ephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers.
(D) Ergonovine and its salts.
(E) Ergotamine and its salts.
(F) N-Acetylanthranilic acid, its esters, and its salts.
(G) Norpseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers.
(H) Phenylacetic acid, its esters, and its salts.
(I) Phenylpropanolamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers.
(J) Piperidine and its salts.
(K) Pseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers.
(L) 3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone.
(M) Methylamine.
(N) Ethylamine.
(O) Propionic anhydride.
(P) Isosafrole.
(Q) Safrole.
(R) Piperonal.
(S) N-Methylephedrine.
(T) N-methylpseudoephedrine.
(U) Hydriodic acid.
(V) Benzaldehyde.
(W) Nitroethane.
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(X) Gamma butyrolactone.
(Y) Any salt, optical isomer, or salt of an optical isomer of the chemicals listed in
subparagraphs (M) through (U) of this paragraph.
(35) The term "list II chemical" means a chemical (other than a list I chemical) specified
by regulation of the Attorney General as a chemical that is used in manufacturing a
controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, and such term includes (until
otherwise specified by regulation of the Attorney General, as considered appropriate by
the Attorney General or upon petition to the Attorney General by any person) the
following chemicals:
(A) Acetic anhydride.
(B) Acetone.
(C) Benzyl chloride.
(D) Ethyl ether.
(E) Repealed. Pub.L. 101-647, Title XXIII, § 2301(b), Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4858
(F) Potassium permanganate.
(G) 2-Butanone (or Methyl Ethyl Ketone).
(H) Toluene.
(I) Iodine.
(J) Hydrochloric gas.
(36) The term "regular customer" means, with respect to a regulated person, a customer
with whom the regulated person has an established business relationship that is reported
to the Attorney General.
(37) The term "regular importer" means, with respect to a listed chemical, a person that
has an established record as an importer of that listed chemical that is reported to the
Attorney General.
(38) The term "regulated person" means a person who manufactures, distributes, imports,
or exports a listed chemical, a tableting machine, or an encapsulating machine or who acts
as a broker or trader for an international transaction involving a listed chemical, a
tableting machine, or an encapsulating machine.
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(39) The term "regulated transaction11 means—
(A) a distribution, receipt, sale, importation, or exportation of, or an international
transaction involving shipment of, a listed chemical, or if the Attorney General
establishes a threshold amount for a specific listed chemical, a threshold amount,
including a cumulative threshold amount for multiple transactions (as determined by the
Attorney General, in consultation with the chemical industry and taking into consideration
the quantities normally used for lawful purposes), of a listed chemical, except that such
term does not include—
(i) a domestic lawful distribution in the usual course of business between agents or
employees of a single regulated person;
(ii) a delivery of a listed chemical to or by a common or contract carrier for carriage in the
lawful and usual course of the business of the common or contract carrier, or to or by a
warehouseman for storage in the lawful and usual course of the business of the
warehouseman, except that if the carriage or storage is in connection with the distribution,
importation, or exportation of a listed chemical to a third person, this clause does not
relieve a distributor, importer, or exporter from compliance with section 830 of this title;
(iii) any category of transaction or any category of transaction for a specific listed
chemical or chemicals specified by regulation of the Attorney General as excluded from
this definition as unnecessary for enforcement of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter;
(iv) any transaction in a listed chemical that is contained in a drug that may be marketed
or distributed lawfully in the United States under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.) unless(I)(aa) the drug contains ephedrine or its salts, optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers,
pseudoephedrine or its salts, optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers, or
phenylpropanolamine or its salts, optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers unless
otherwise provided by regulation of the Attorney General issued pursuant to section
814(e) of this title, except that any sale of ordinary over-the-counter pseudoephedrine or
phenylpropanolamine products by retail distributors shall not be a regulated transaction
(except as provided in section 401(d) of the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control
Act of 1996); or
(bb) the Attorney General has determined under section 814 of this title that the drug or
group of drugs is being diverted to obtain the listed chemical for use in the illicit
production of a controlled substance; and
11

(II) the quantity of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, phenylpropanolamine, or other listed
chemical contained in the drug included in the transaction or multiple transactions equals
or exceeds the threshold established for that chemical by the Attorney General, except
that the threshold for any sale of products containing pseudoephedrine or
phenylpropanolamine products by retail distributors or by distributors required to submit
reports by section 830(b)(3) of this title shall be 9 grams of pseudoephedrine or 9 grams
of phenylpropanolamine in a single transaction and sold in package sizes of not more than
3 grams of pseudoephedrine base or 3 grams of phenylpropanolamine base; or
(v) any transaction in a chemical mixture which the Attorney General has by regulation
designated as exempt from the application of this subchapter and subchapter II of this
chapter based on a finding that the mixture is formulated in such a way that it cannot be
easily used in the illicit production of a controlled substance and that the listed chemical
or chemicals contained in the mixture cannot be readily recovered; and
(B) a distribution, importation, or exportation of a tableting machine or encapsulating
machine.
(40) The term "chemical mixture" means a combination of two or more chemical
substances, at least one of which is not a list I chemical or a list II chemical, except that
such term does not include any combination of a list I chemical or a list II chemical with
another chemical that is present solely as an impurity.
(41)(A) The term "anabolic steroid" means any drug or hormonal substance, chemically
and pharmacologically related to testosterone (other than estrogens, progestins,
corticosteroids, and dehydroepiandrosterone), and includes
(i) androstanediol-(I) 3 « B E T A » , 1 7 « B E T A » - d i h y d r o x y - 5 « B E T A » - androstane; and
(II) 3aa,17aa-dihydroxy-5cca- androstane;
(ii) androstanedione (5oca-androstan-3,17-dione);
(iii) androstenediol(I) 1 -androstenediol ( 3 « B E T A » , 17«BETA>>-dihydroxy-5«BETA»-androst-1 ene);
(II) 1-androstenediol (3aa,17aa-dihydroxy-5aa-androst-l-ene);
(III) 4-androstenediol (3«BETA»,17«BETA»-dihydroxy-androst-4-ene); and
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(IV) 5-androstenediol ( 3 « B E T A » , 17«BETA»-dihydroxy-androst-5-ene);
(iv) androstenedione-(I) 1-androstenedione ([5oca]-androst-l-en-3,17-dione);
(II) 4-androstenedione (androst-4-en-3,17-dione); and
(III) 5-androstenedione (androst-5-en-3,17-dione);
(v) bolasterone (7aa,17aa- dimethyl-17cca-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one);
(vi) boldenone (17«BETA»-hydroxyandrost-l ? 4 9 -diene-3-one);
(vii) calusterone ( 7 « B E T A » , 17«BETA»-dimethyl-17«BETA»-hydroxyandrost4- en-3-one);
(viii) clostebol (4-chloro-17«BETA»-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one);
(ix) dehydrochloromethyltestosterone (4-chloro-17«BETA»-hydroxy-17«BETA»methyl-androst-l5 4-dien-3-one);
(x) A? 1-dihydrotestosterone (a.k.a. ffl-testosteroneff) (17A?-hydroxy-5A?-androst-l-en3-one);
(xi) 4-dihydrotestosterone (17«BETA»-hydroxy-androstan-3-one);
(xii) drostanolone (17«BETA»-hydroxy-2«BETA»- methyl-5 « B E T A » androstan-3- one);
(xiii) ethylestrenol (17aa-ethyl-17cca-hydroxyestr-4-ene);
(xiv) fluoxymesterone (9-fluoro-17aa-methyl-llcca, 17aa-dihydroxyandrost-4-en-3- one);
(xv) formebolone (2-formyl-17aa-methyl-llaa, 17aa-dihydroxyandrost-l,4-dien-3- one);
(xvi) furazabol (17oca-methyl-17oca-hydroxyandrostano[2,3-c]-furazan);
(xvii) 13«BETA»-ethyl-17«BETA»-hydroxygon-4-en-3-one;
(xviii) 4-hydroxytestosterone (4,17«BETA»-dihydroxy-androst-4-en-3-one);
(xix) 4-hydroxy-19-nortestosterone (4 5 17«BETA»-dihydroxy-estr-4-en-3-one);
(xx) mestanolone (17aa-methyl- 17aa-hydroxy-5aa-androstan-3-one);
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(xxi) mesterolone (laa-methyl-17aa-hydroxy-[5oca] -androstan-3-one);
(xxii) methandienone (17aa-methyl-17aa-hydroxyandrost-1,4-dien-3-one);
(xxiii) methandriol (17cca-methyl- 3oca,17aa-dihydroxyandrost-5-ene);
(xxiv) methenolone (1 -methyl-17«BETA»-hydroxy-5«BETA»-androst-1 -en-3one);
(xxv) 17aa-methyl-3oca, 17cca-dihydroxy-5aa-androstane;
(xxvi) 17cca-methyl-3cca5 17aa-dihydroxy-5aa-androstane;
(xxvii) 17oca-methyl-3oca, 17cca-dihydroxyandrost-4-ene.
(xxviii) 17aa-methyl-4-hydroxynandrolone (17aa-methyl-4-hydroxy-17cca-hydroxyestr-4en-3-one);
(xxix) methyldienolone (17oca-methyl-17oca-hydroxyestra-4,9( 10)-dien-3-one);
(xxx) methyltrienolone (17aa-methyl-17cca-hydroxyestra-4,9-l l-trien-3-one);
(xxxi) methyltestosterone (17aa-methyl-17oca-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one);
(xxxii) mibolerone (7cca, 17aa-dimethyl-17aa-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);
(xxxiii) 17oca-methyl-aa 1-dihydrotestosterone (17aa-hydroxy-17aa-methyl-5oca-androstl-en-3-one) (a.k.a. "17-oca-methyl-l-testosterone");
(xxxiv) nandrolone (17«BETA»-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);
(xxxv) norandrostenediol—
(I) 19-nor-4-androstenediol ( 3 « B E T A » , 17<<BETA>>-dihydroxyestr-4-ene);
(II) 19-nor-4-androstenediol (3 oca, 17aa-dihydroxyestr-4-ene);
(III) 19-nor-5-androstenediol ( 3 « B E T A » , 17«BETA»-dihydroxyestr-5-ene); and
(IV) 19-nor-5-androstenediol (3oca, 17aa-dihydroxyestr-5-ene);
(xxxvi) norandrostenedione(I) 19-nor-4-androstenedione (estr-4-en-3,17-dione); and
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(II) 19-nor-5-androstenedione (estr-5-en-3,17-dione;
(xxxvii) norbolethone ( 1 3 « B E T A » , 17«BETA»-diethyl-17«BETA»hydroxygon-4- en-3-one);
(xxxviii) norclostebol (4-chloro 17«BETA»-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);
(xxxix) norethandrolone (17 oca-ethyl-17oca-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);
(xl) normethandrolone (17aa-methyl-17aa-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one);
(xli) oxandrolone (17aa-methyl-17aa-hydroxy-2-oxa-[5aa]- androstan-3-one);
(xlii) oxymesterone (17oca-methyl-4,17aa-dihydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one);
(xliii) oxymetholone (17aa-methyl-2-hydroxymethylene-17aa-hydroxy- [5aa]-androstan3-one);
(xliv) stanozolol (17aa-methyl- 17aa-hydroxy-[5aa]-androst-2-eno[3,2-c]-pyrazole);
(xlv) stenbolone (17«BETA»-hydroxy-2-methyl-[5«BETA»] -androst-l-en-3-one);
(xlvi) testolactone (13-hydroxy-3-oxo-13,17-secoandrosta-l,4-dien-17-oic acid lactone);
(xlvii) testosterone (17«BETA»-hydroxyandrost-4-en-3-one);
(xlviii) tetrahydrogestrinone (13 « B E T A » , 17«BETA»-diethyl-17«BETA»hydroxygon-4,9, ll-trien-3-one);
(xlix) trenbolone (17«BETA»-hydroxyestr-4 5 9 ? ll-trien-3-one); and
(xlx) any salt, ester, or ether of a drug or substance described in this paragraph.
The substances excluded under this subparagraph may at any time be scheduled by the
Attorney General in accordance with the authority and requirements of subsections (a)
through (c) of section 811 of this title.
(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), such term does not include an anabolic steroid
which is expressly intended for administration through implants to cattle or other
nonhuman species and which has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services for such administration.
(ii) If any person prescribes, dispenses, or distributes such steroid for human use, such
person shall be considered to have prescribed, dispensed, or distributed an anabolic
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steroid within the meaning of subparagraph (A).
(42) The term "international transaction" means a transaction involving the shipment of a
listed chemical across an international border (other than a United States border) in which
a broker or trader located in the United States participates.
(43) The terms "broker" and "trader" mean a person that assists in arranging an
international transaction in a listed chemical by—
(A) negotiating contracts;
(B) serving as an agent or intermediary; or
(C) bringing together a buyer and seller, a buyer and transporter, or a seller and
transporter.
(44) The term "felony drug offense" means an offense that is punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country
that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids,
or depressant or stimulant substances.
(45) The term "ordinary over-the-counter pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine
product" means any product containing pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine that is—
(A) regulated pursuant to this subchapter; and
(B)(i) except for liquids, sold in package sizes of not more than 3.0 grams of
pseudoephedrine base or 3.0 grams of phenylpropanolamine base, and that is packaged in
blister packs, each blister containing not more than two dosage units, or where the use of
blister packs is technically infeasible, that is packaged in unit dose packets or pouches;
and
(ii) for liquids, sold in package sizes of not more than 3.0 grams of pseudoephedrine base
or 3.0 grams of phenylpropanolamine base.
(46)(A) The term "retail distributor" means a grocery store, general merchandise store,
drug store, or other entity or person whose activities as a distributor relating to
pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine products are limited almost exclusively to sales
for personal use, both in number of sales and volume of sales, either directly to walk-in
customers or in face-to-face transactions by direct sales.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, sale for personal use means the sale of belowthreshold quantities in a single transaction to an individual for legitimate medical use.
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(C) For purposes of this paragraph, entities are defined by reference to the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code, as follows:
(i) A grocery store is an entity within SIC code 5411.
(ii) A general merchandise store is an entity within SIC codes 5300 through 5399 and
5499.
(iii) A drug store is an entity within SIC code 5912.

42 U.S.C. § 1996a
(a) Congressional findings and declarations
The Congress finds and declares that—
(1) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a
religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant in
perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures;
(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by Federal
regulation;
(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws which are similar to, or are in conformance
with, the Federal regulation which protects the ceremonial use of peyote by Indian
religious practitioners, 22 States have not done so, and this lack of uniformity has created
hardship for Indian people who participate in such religious ceremonies;
(4) the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872(1990\ held that the First Amendment does not protect Indian practitioners
who use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies, and also raised uncertainty whether this
religious practice would be protected under the compelling State interest standard; and
(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the religious use of peyote by
Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and increase
the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment.
(b) Use, possession, or transportation of peyote
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(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or transportation of
peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the
practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United
States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or discriminated against on the basis of
such use, possession or transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise
applicable benefits under public assistance programs.

(2) This section does not prohibit such reasonable regulation and registration by the Drug
Enforcement Administration of those persons who cultivate, harvest, or distribute peyote
as may be consistent with the purposes of this section and section 1996 of this title.
(3) This section does not prohibit application of the provisions of section 481.111(a) of
Vernonfs Texas Health and Safety Code Annotated, in effect on October 6, 1994, insofar
as those provisions pertain to the cultivation, harvest, and distribution of peyote.

(4) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any Federal department or agency, in carrying
out its statutory responsibilities and functions, from promulgating regulations establishing
reasonable limitations on the use or ingestion of peyote prior to or during the performance
of duties by sworn law enforcement officers or personnel directly involved in public
transportation or any other safety-sensitive positions where the performance of such
duties may be adversely affected by such use or ingestion. Such regulations shall be
adopted only after consultation with representatives of traditional Indian religions for
which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to their practice. Any regulation
promulgated pursuant to this section shall be subject to the balancing test set forth in
section 3 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Public Law 103-141: 42 U.S.C.
2000bb-n.

(5) This section shall not be construed as requiring prison authorities to permit, nor shall
it be construed to prohibit prison authorities from permitting, access to peyote by Indians
while incarcerated within Federal or State prison facilities.

(6) Subject to the provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Public Law 103141: 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-n f42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.], this section shall not be
construed to prohibit States from enacting or enforcing reasonable traffic safety laws or regulations.
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(7) Subject to the provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Public Law 103141; 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-l), this section does not prohibit the Secretary of Defense from
promulgating regulations establishing reasonable limitations on the use, possession,
transportation, or distribution of peyote to promote military readiness, safety, or
compliance with international law or laws of other countries. Such regulations shall be
adopted only after consultation with representatives of traditional Indian religions for
which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to their practice.

(c) Definitions
For purposes of this section—
(1) the term "Indian" means a member of an Indian tribe;
(2) the term "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other organized group
or community of Indians, including any Alaska Native village (as defined in, or
established pursuant to, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1601 et
seq.)), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by
the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians;
(3) the term "Indian religion" means any religion—
(A) which is practiced by Indians, and
(B) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional Indian culture or
community; and
(4) the term "State" means any State of the United States, and any political subdivision thereof.
(d) Protection of rights of Indians and Indian tribes
Nothing in this section shall be construed as abrogating, diminishing, or otherwise
affecting(1) the inherent rights of any Indian tribe;
(2) the rights, express or implicit, of any Indian tribe which exist under treaties, Executive
orders, and laws of the United States;
(3) the inherent right of Indians to practice their religions; and
19

(4) the right of Indians to practice their religions under any Federal or State law.
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